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Abstract. From what perspective should creativity of a system be
considered? Are we interested in the creativity of the system’s out-
put? The creativity of the system itself? Or of its creative processes?
Creativity as measured by internal features or by external feedback?
Traditionally within computational creativity the focus had been on
the creativity of the system’s Products or of its Processes, though this
focus has widened recently regarding the role of the audience or the
field surrounding the creative system. In the wider creativity research
community a broader take is prevalent: the creative Person is consid-
ered as well as the environment or Press within which the creative
entity operates in. Here we have the Four Ps of creativity: Person,
Product, Process and Press. This paper presents the Four Ps, explain-
ing each of the Four Ps in the context of creativity research and how it
relates to computational creativity. To illustrate how useful the Four
Ps can be in taking a fuller perspective on creativity, the concepts
of novelty and value explored from each of the Four P perspectives,
uncovering aspects that may otherwise be overlooked. This paper ar-
gues that the broader view of creativity afforded by the Four Ps is
vital in guiding us towards more encompassing and comprehensive
computational investigations of creativity.
1 Introduction
A practical issue arises when considering the evaluation of a com-
putational creativity system: from what perspective should creativity
of a system be considered? Are we interested in the creativity of the
system’s output? The creativity of the system itself? Or of its creative
processes? Creativity as measured by internal features or by external
feedback?
The computational creativity community has traditionally consid-
ered creativity from the perspective of the creative output produced
by a system, or the processes employed within creative systems (with
notable exceptions, such as Saunders [48]). The call for this ICCC
2014 conference invites papers addressing the ‘Process vs. product:
addressing the issue of evaluating/estimating creativity (or progress
towards it) in computational systems through study of what they pro-
duce, what they do and combinations thereof.’
This paper argues that to consider process and product is not
enough; computational creativity should be considered and explored
from four different perspectives, known as the Four Ps: the creative
Person, Product, Process and Press (or environment) [43, 26].
The Four Ps have long been prevalent in creativity research re-
lating to humans2 and enable a more inclusive and encompassing
approach to the study of creativity and accommodating multiple rel-
evant perspectives. Here the Four Ps are presented and considered
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2 Variants of these Ps also arise in slightly different guises in non-related
areas, such as software project management [16] or education [2].
in the light of how they are relevant to computational creativity re-
searchers.
1.1 The product/process debate in computational
creativity evaluation
‘As a research community, we have largely focussed on assess-
ment of creativity via assessment of the artefacts produced.’ [8,
p. 1]
As illustrated by the ICCC 2014 call for papers, one important
debate in computational creativity is about whether evaluation of a
creative system should focus exclusively on the output produced by
the system, or whether the processes built into the system should
also be taken into account. Should both product and process should
be included in evaluation [39, 8, 20], or should evaluation concen-
trate solely on the product of systems [45]? Ritchie [45] stated that
examining the process is unimportant for creativity, arguing that hu-
mans normally judge the creativity of others by what they produce,
because one cannot easily observe the underlying process of human
creativity. Ritchie therefore advocated a black-box testing approach,
where the inner program workings are treated as unknown and eval-
uation concentrates on the system’s results. Later, however, Ritchie
[46] conceded that it can be important to consider a system’s ‘mech-
nisms’ in the case of ‘more theoretical research’[46, p. 147].
While it is true that we can only use the material we have avail-
able to form an evaluation, evaluation experiments [36, 19] show that
people often make assumptions about process in their judgements
on product. As Hofstadter pointedout, ‘covert mechanisms can be
deeply probed and eventually revealed merely by means of watching
overt behaviour ... [this approach] lies at the very heart of modern
science.’ [15, quoted in p. 10, [39]]. Pearce & Wiggins [36] discussed
how our interpretation of how something was produced is important,
even if the actual method is unknown, and that such an interpreta-
tion can be derived if people are repeatedly exposed to the compo-
sitional systems (human or computational) that they are evaluating.
Collins [6] discussed how making reasonable assumptions can assist
the reverse-engineering3 of program code from output, in scenarios
where white-box testing (evaluation with access to the program code)
is not possible.
Colton [8] acknowledged Ritchie’s arguments but quotes exam-
ples from art to demonstrate that process is as important as the end
product when evaluating creativity, at least in the artistic domain. As
evidence, Colton cites conceptual art for details on conceptual art in
the context of this debate, where the concepts and motivations be-
hind the artistic process are a significant contribution of the artwork.
Sol LeWitt defined Conceptual Art [25] as an art form where ‘the
3 Reverse-engineering is the process of identifying and perhaps replicating
how a product is made, through analysis of that product.
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idea or concept is the most important aspect of the work. ... The idea
becomes a machine that makes the art.’ Two examples are Tracey
Emin’s controversial exhibit My Bed (1999) and Duchamp’s Foun-
tain (1917). Jordanous [20] makes similar arguments for creativity
in musical improvisation, finding that the process of improvisation is
often seen as more relevant for creativity than the end result.
If assessing how creative a piece of conceptual art or a musical
improvisation is, solely by evaluating the product, then there are two
negative consequences:
1. The primary intentions of the artist/musician are ignored (their
focus is on how the creative work is made rather than the end
result).
2. The level of creativity presented will probably be underestimated,
especially if the creative process results in producing something
that might seem commonplace outside the context of that art in-
stallation/musical performance.
Colton [8] also posed a thought experiment that considers two
near-identical paintings presented at an exhibition. In the first paint-
ing, the dots are placed randomly, whereas in the second, the dots’ lo-
cations represent the artist’s friendships with various people. Colton
argued that the second painting would be more appealing to pur-
chase than the first, though the end product is very similar, due to the
process by which it was created. Colton’s thought experiment illus-
trates how process can impact on our judgement of creative artefacts,
though one could question if the experiment explores perception of
creativity, or of quality/appeal.
The thought experiment described by Ventura [54] gives further
evidence (perhaps unintentionally) on how knowledge of the creative
process affects how we evaluate creativity. Two creative systems, the
RASTER and iRASTER systems, were designed by Ventura to be
decidedly non-creative. If these systems were implemented and their
generated images were given to people to evaluate without telling the
evaluators how they were produced, the evaluators may well rate the
creativity of the system highly. Supplying the evaluators with details
of how a program works, though, could have a detrimental impact on
the subsequent evaluations [11, 8].
One issue with creativity is analogous to the adage that a magi-
cian never reveals their secrets. This adage is based on the fact that
tricks do not appear so impressive once you have found out how the
magician performed the trick. Similarly things can appear to be less
creative when you know how they were produced:4
‘it is not unknown for critics of AI to refuse to accept programs
as creative (or intelligent) once the mundane mechanistic nature
of the inner workings are revealed’ [44, p. 4]
Colton [8] intentionally sidestepped this issue by reporting on his
artistic system in high-level terms only, rather than giving details of
the program [8, p. 8].
Until recently, computational creativity evaluation methodologies
mainly looked solely at a system’s products [45, for example] or at
a combination of the products and the process [39]. Recently it has
been acknowledged that there is more to creativity than process and
product, with the Creative Tripod [8], whose evaluative framework
is influenced by how an audience perceives the creativity of a sys-
tem, SPECS [20] which requires the researcher to investigate what
creativity means in the context of their system, and the FACE/IDEA
4 If the inner workings of a program are very impressive, complex or novel,
then we may still be impressed by the program, but this is a different per-
spective to whether or not we think the program is creative.
models [9] which consider various aesthetic features and interactions
between audience and system. Work on computationally creative so-
cieties has also developed in the last few years [48, is a significant
example].
Along a similar broadening of perspectives, the next section
brings in work from the wider creativity research community, ex-
amining further viewpoints - the creative person operating in a
press/environment - and relating these viewpoints to a computational
creativity standpoint.
2 The Four Ps of creativity
One major approach in creativity research is to break down creativity
into four perspectives, commonly referred to as the Four Ps [43, 51,
34, 26, 49, 53, 35]:
• Person: The individual that is creative.
• Process: What the creative individual does to be creative.
• Product: What is produced as a result of the creative process.
• Press: The environment in which the creativity is situated.
Figure 1. A simplified view of how the Four Ps fit together in creativity
Rhodes [43] was perhaps first to identify the four P perspectives.
Rhodes collected 40 definitions of creativity and 16 definitions of
imagination. The ‘Four P’ dimensions of creativity emerged from
analysis of these definitions.5 Several people seem to have indepen-
dently identified four similar themes of creativity [26, 51, 34, 35],
boosting the credibility of the Four Ps.
Plucker, Beghetto & Dow [41] conducted a literature survey in-
vestigating the use (or absence) of creativity definitions in creativity
research. As part of this review, Plucker et al. used their analysis
to derive their own definition by identifying reoccurring themes and
forming these into an inclusive definition which happens to account
for each of the Four Ps:
‘Creativity is the interaction among aptitude, process, and envi-
ronment by which an individual or group produces a perceptible
product that is both novel and useful as defined within a social
context’ [41, p. 90]
In reviewing Four Ps research, Kaufman [23] described adden-
dums that have been suggested for the Four Ps: persuasion [49]
5 As Rhodes’ work appeared in a relatively unknown journal, many later ad-
vocates of a ‘Four Ps’-style approach to creativity seem unaware of Rhodes’
contribution (e.g. Odena, 2009, personal communications), so fail to cite
him.
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and potential [47]. In general, however, the Four Ps have been
adopted as they were originally conceived by various researchers
[43, 51, 34, 26].
2.1 The Four Ps: Person
This perspective addresses human characteristics associated with
creative individuals or groups of people. Encouraged by Guilford’s
call in 1950 for studying the creative person, an abundance of dif-
ferent personal characteristics have been associated with creativity
[43, 51, 24, 53, 35], ranging from personality traits, attitudes, intel-
ligence and temperament to habits and behaviours (for example cu-
riosity, persistence, independence and openness). Some of these are
closely related; others are contradictory. Rhodes mentioned the rele-
vance to creativity of people’s personality traits, attitudes and habits,
physique and intelligence and the identifiable features of creative
people, as well as referring to people’s temperament, habits, self-
concept, value systems, defence mechanisms, and behaviour [43, p.
307].
Empirical studies up until 1968 were summarised by Stein [52]
and were combined into a list of 18 distinct personality characteris-
tics of a creative person, including aspects such as curiosity, persis-
tence, independence and openness. Stein used these characteristics
to identify creative individuals for study. There is a risk of circularity
here, as the selection criteria for creative individuals chooses people
to be studied, then the study involves examining those characteris-
tics and criteria. Stein’s work has not stood the test of time, with few
current citations.
Several researchers subdivide the ‘Person’ category into finer-
grained groups. Three sub categories of the ‘pupil’ perspective
emerged during Odena & Welch’s work [35]: personal characteristics
of the pupil, their individual learning style (either adapting to new in-
formation or deriving new information themselves) and the influence
of the pupil’s background. Koestler [24] described three types of cre-
ative person: the Artist, the Sage and the Jester. Through Tardif &
Sternberg’s review of definitions of creativity, three main categories
were identified with which to describe creative people: cognitive at-
tributes, personality attributes/motivation and developmental influ-
ences. Tardif & Sternberg suggested three resultant modes of study
of human creativity: cognitive psychology; psychometric testing; and
study of human development.
These discrepancies and the sheer quantity of attributes together
place an obstacle in the way of compiling a definitive list of attributes
of a creative person and instead provoke disagreements on exactly
which cognitive characteristics should be attributed to creative peo-
ple. Tardif & Sternberg’s review showed that as of 1988, different
authors highlighted a variety of characteristics, with no general con-
sensus and no characteristics common to all reports [53, Table 17.1,
p. 434].
2.1.1 The Person in Computational Creativity
In computational creativity, the creative person could be analogous to
the computer, or perhaps more accurately, to the computer program,
software, or to a creative agent within a multi-agent system. Here
the machine is the hardware hosting the creative agent, much as we
might distinguish between physical and functional characteristics of
a ‘Person’.
Interesting work has been done on modelling creative agents, for
example by Saunders [48], although the emphasis in computational
creativity software tends to be on product generation and to some
extent, process modelling, rather than on the modelling of character-
istics of a creative Person in computational format. This is because
computational creativity systems tend to be oriented towards a par-
ticular goal or domain, rather than being generally creative, as we can
see by the plethora of domain-specific systems (as opposed to mod-
elling of creative personal characteristics) in the various proceedings
of ICCC conferences (International Conference on Computational
Creativity). As argued in [20], different types of creativity require
domain specific skills to some extent, so domain-specific computa-
tional creativity systems tend to be built around the most prominent
necessary skills for that domain.
In terms of evaluating creative systems, Colton’s Creative Tripod
[8] emphasises the need for systems to demonstrate skill, imagina-
tion and appreciation before they can be considered as a candidate
creative system, all three of which are alluding to personal character-
istics.
Features, traits and aspects of the creative system can be studied,
and it would be fascinating to explore how general creative personal
characteristics could be specifically modelled within creative sys-
tems (see the Process section, next). Computational modelling of
characteristics that encourage creativity could help us progress our
systems to be able to be creative in more than one system which
they were originally designed for; this would be significant progress
in our pursuit of modelling creativity as a phenomenon which tran-
scends different types of creative activity.
The ‘Person’ could also entail the individual(s) interacting with a
creativity support system or co-creative system which interacts with
people[27, 22]. Another possible interpretation of the ‘Person’ in
computational creativity would be to acknowledge the role of the
programmer(s), tester(s), researcher(s) and peers involved in shaping
the project.
2.2 The Four Ps: Process
The creative process has been broken down into a series of sequential
or cyclic stages occurring over time [42, 55] or subtasks [35].
In their work on student creativity in school music lessons, Odena
& Welch [35] broke down the creative process into subtasks, identi-
fying various types of process (e.g. different activities, group process,
the structuredness or otherwise of a process and composition by im-
provisation) rather than tracing a linear progression of subprocesses.
It is often stressed that creativity is not just the first flash of in-
spiration, but is also the activity that validates, develops, and refines
that first idea; rather than occurring at one point in time, creativity
develops over a period of time [55, 42, 53]. Tardif & Sternberg [53]
questioned whether creativity is a social or an individual process. The
social view of creativity has notably been promoted by Csikszentmi-
halyi [12].
2.2.1 The Process in Computational Creativity
In computational creativity, the creative process might be that em-
ployed by a single piece of software, or the interactions between mul-
tiple machines or programs, or the interactions between machine and
human users. As described above, the computational creativity com-
munity has given some attention to the concept of creative processes
employed within computational creativity, with growing attention
paid to this aspect in recent years. For example, the FlowR frame-
work [5] is designed to facilitate creative computational workflows
by chaining together processes in a linear pattern, and from personal
communications with members of the project team, there are plans
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to consider non-linear chains of processes as well. Additionally, the
work by Joanna Misztal on poetry generation [31] specifically fo-
cusses on the processes required to generate poetry, at various levels
of abstraction.
The generate-and-test [30, 38] or engagement-reflection approach
[40] specifically models the creative process as a cycle of generating
artefacts then improving the generation process via evaluating the
generation phase. This is an approach which deserves broader adop-
tion within computational creativity; evaluation is a critical part of
the creative process [42, 12]. In terms of post-implementation evalu-
ation, the FACE model for evaluation of creative systems [9] places
importance on computational systems being able to report on the cre-
ative process (this report is referred to in the FACE framework as a
Frame).
There are multiple theories about how human creativity processes
are structured (see for example [42, 12, 23, 14]). Computational cre-
ativity research can provide a test-bed for these psychological the-
ories and allow us to explore if implementing the theories result in
creative behaviour. Conferences such as the Creativity and Cognition
series showcase work that links between theory and practice to some
extent, but further activity along these lines would emphasise the va-
lidity of computational creativity research, allowing computational
work to contribute to human creativity research and vice-versa.
2.3 The Four Ps: Product
Many authors advocate that proof of creativity is necessary to be con-
sidered creative [21, 53, 41, 44]. The product-centric view adopted
by computational creativity researchers such as Ritchie [45], that cre-
ative products are both necessary and sufficient for creativity, was
present in earlier human creativity research [21]. But, inspired by
Guilford’s seminal 1950 address on creativity research, emphasis in
human creativity research shifted from identifying creative individ-
uals post-production of creative work, to predicting future potential
for creativity in individuals. This change in emphasis is illustrated
in the proliferation of psychometric tests [23, 19] within creativity
research.
Tardif & Sternberg [53] considered the creative product more
briefly than the other three ‘Ps’ in their review, deciding that while
a creative product is essential for creativity, it is not enough merely
to generate a product; the product should also be considered in a
domain-specific context.
Computational creativity research has long acknowledged the im-
portance of the output or artefacts generated by creative systems, as
described above. To borrow a metaphor from human creativity re-
search, it has been common (until recently) for computational cre-
ativity to follow the product-centric approach to creativity as advo-
cated by Kagan: ‘Creativity refers to a product, and if made by a man,
we give him the honor of the adjective’ [21, p. viii].
2.3.1 The Product in Computational Creativity
Generating creative products has been an area of significant success
for computational creativity. To see examples, one just needs to con-
sult any year’s proceedings of the International Conference on Com-
putational Creativity where there are multiple examples to be found
of systems which are reported in terms of the products they gener-
ate. The success of systems is often reported in terms of what kind
of artefacts they generate, as noted in [18]. Some systems have been
evaluated using Graeme Ritchie’s empirical criteria [44, 45], which
exclusively focuses on evaluating the products of computational sys-
tems without considering any of the other three Ps.6
2.4 The Four Ps: Press/Environment
The Press perspective encompasses a bidirectional perspective be-
tween the environment which influences the creator and receives the
creative work, and the creator who publicises their work and is given
feedback on what they produce. Tardif & Sternberg [53] considered
both creative domains themselves and the social environments in
which creative people are influenced as they employ creative pro-
cess, advertise their creative products and receive feedback. Rhodes
[43] concentrated on the role that the environment plays on a person
during the creative process, rather than how the creative produce is
judged by the external world after being created. Rhodes reflected
on how everyone is different, so everyone perceives the world in a
unique way and processes ideas according to their own contexts.
Of the Four Ps, this is the perspective that is often neglected when
one takes an individualistic view of creativity. In general creativity
theorists do however acknowledge the influence of the environment
in which creativity is situated [49, 13]. If one concentrates on an indi-
vidual’s creativity, however, the Press perspective is often neglected,
even if unintentionally. For example, although stating that ‘[t]o be
appreciated as creative. a work of art or a scientific theory has to be
understood in a specific relation to what preceded it’ [3, p. 74], Bo-
den’s treatment of creativity mainly focused on different cognitive
processes of creativity, rather than a detailed examination of social
or environmental influences.
2.4.1 The Press in Computational Creativity
Some computational creativity researchers are starting to highlight
the importance of the environment in which a creative system is situ-
ated [50, 17, 37, 48], with some of this work influenced by the DIFI
(Domain-Individual-Field-Interaction) framework [12]. Social inter-
action between creative agents and their audience is an area which
has been neglected by all but a few groups of researchers: for exam-
ple nearly 75% of papers in the 2014 International Conference on
Computational Creativity failed to make any reference to social or
interactive aspects of creativity. But creativity cannot exist in a vac-
uum. A recent increase in development of the interactivity of creative
systems (especially where this affects the way these systems works)
is pleasing to see and deserves further attention [10].
There is a separate point to acknowledge regarding Press in com-
putational creativity. As computational creativity researchers, we
should stay aware of any potential biases that may be introduced,
should an audience be aware that the creative agent of interest is
computational rather than human [32, 19].7
2.5 Interaction between the Four Ps
Simonton [49] saw discrepancies between combining the Four Ps in
theory and in practice:
‘Now, in an ideal state of affairs, it should not matter which
one of the four p’s our investigations target, for they all will
converge on the same underlying phenomenon. ... But reality
is not so simple, needless to say. The creative process need not
6 Recently proposed evaluation methods such as [8, 9, 19] place more em-
phasis on the other three ‘Ps’.
7 Many thanks to the anonymous reviewer who noted this point.
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arrive at a creative product, nor must all creative products ensue
from the same process or personality type; and others may ig-
nore the process, discredit the product, or reject the personality
when making attributions about creativity.’ [49, p. 387]
From this, one conclusion which seems to follow naturally is that
an accurate and comprehensive definition of creativity must account
for the (potential) presence of all four aspects, in order to be com-
plete. Simonton, however, concluded that ‘[i]f we cannot assume that
all four aspects cohesively hang together, then it may be best to se-
lect one single definition and subordinate the others to that orienta-
tion’ [49, p. 387], with his natural research inclination leading him
to focus his work on persuasion, his term for the Press/Environment
aspect.
The mysterious impression often associated with creativity [56, 3,
23] can be explained to some extent when one or more of the Four
Ps are not accounted for:
‘Each strand [of the Four Ps] has unique identity academically,
but only in unity do the four strands operate functionally. It is
this very fact of synthesis that causes fog in talk about creativity
and this may be the basis for the semblance of a “cult”.’ [43, p.
307]
Rhodes argued that creativity research should follow a specific
path: ‘from product to person and thence to process and to press.’
[43, p. 309]
‘Objective investigation into the nature of the creative process
can proceed in only one direction, i.e. from product to person
and thence to process and to press.’ [43, p. 309]
Such a statement makes Rhodes’s contribution less useful. For ex-
ample, the Press (environment) in which one is creative has some
influence on the creative Process, so one may prefer to study how
Press and Person interact before looking at Process issues. Simon-
ton viewed creativity as how a person’s ideas emerge as influential
when that person, by chance, has new ideas and promotes them to
influence others. Creative people would not be equivalent to lucky
people, by this interpretation, but chance would intervene in their
success. Simonton refers to this as the ‘chance-configuration theory’
that ‘outlines the general conditions that favor creativity’ [49, p. 422].
Tardif & Sternberg [53] treated each of the Four Ps individually,
‘as these really are separate levels of analysis, and it is from com-
parisons within levels that coherent statements about our knowledge
of creativity can be made’ [53, p. 429]. Tardif & Sternberg’s sum-
mary is weakened somewhat by this as it does not make comparisons
across the Four Ps, despite highlighting Simonton’s emphasis on the
interactions and relations between these four views [49]. In contrast
Mooney [34] argued that the four approaches should be integrated in
a model of creativity, proposing a model that ‘puts together the four
approaches by showing them to be aspects of one unifying idea’ [34,
p. 333]. While Mooney’s claims become rather grandiose at points,
Mooney’s more specific contributions on creativity match neatly with
the four Ps approach identified elsewhere at that date [43, 51]
2.5.1 Interaction between Four Ps in Computational
Creativity
This paper argues that we can make significant progress in compu-
tational creativity by considering all four Ps in our computational
creativity work. Tony Veale’s tagline for the ICCC’2012 conference
sums up current aspirations of computational creativity well; Veale
characterises computational creativity research as ‘scoffing at mere
generation for more than a decade’. Generation of creative products
is only a quarter of the full picture of creativity, only one of the Four
‘Ps’. Granted, we have achieved much success in product generation,
as exemplified by exhibitions, concerts and other demonstrations of
creative products reported in various papers on computational cre-
ativity systems [18]. However, the more mature work and exciting
potential comes from the incorporation of the other three Ps, at least
to some extent, such as in [40, 48, 31].
3 Applying the Four Ps: examples of novelty and
value
Novelty (originality, newness) and value (usefulness, appropriate-
ness) form key parts of creativity [28, 3, 45, 20], often being identi-
fied as the two main aspects of computational creativity [39, 45, 4,
for example].8 Work in computational creativity illustrates both nov-
elty and utility from each of the Four P perspectives, although some
perspectives are represented more plentifully within computational
creativity than others. To illustrate the discussions above, we can dis-
cuss novelty and value in computational creativity from each of the
Four P perspectives. Considering novelty from each of the Four Ps:
Product Novelty is well associated with system outputs and prod-
ucts: how novel are the generated artefact(s)? The novelty of arte-
facts generated by computational creativity systems is a key con-
sideration in Ritchie’s empirical criteria for evaluating creative
systems [45].
Process A creative process can take a novel approach or be im-
plemented in a novel way, perhaps employing new algorithms or
techniques or different approaches. Efforts at trying new processes
and combinations thereof are being encouraged by systems such
as the FlowR framework [5], which focuses specifically on en-
abling us to chain different processes together for creative pur-
poses.
Person Creativity can be performed by a new creative entity,
which demonstrates or uses novel characteristics relevant to that
creativity. As is often encountered in computational creativity
work, implementing or running a creative system on new hard-
ware or in different software may also impact upon the system’s
performance and may have unexpected results. The number of
new systems presented each year at the International Conference
on Computational Creativity exemplifies how novel creative enti-
ties continually arise in computational creativity research.9 (Also,
the novelty of unexpected results is often unintentionally exempli-
fied when live demos of these systems are attempted in unfamiliar
computing setups.)
Press The creativity demonstrated by a system can be noted as
being novel in a particular environment, even though it may be
commonplace in other environments. The system may also ex-
ploit the surrounding press in previously unexplored ways. This
was demonstrated neatly by the combination of two systems in
[33], where a textual annotation system interacted with a system
that generates emotion-driven music. The combination resulted in
novel interpretations of fairy tales; such results would not have
arisen were the systems operating in isolation.
Considering value from each of the Four Ps:
8 It should be clarified that for this author, creativity consists of consider-
ably more than novelty and value, though these are two key components of
creativity. See [20].
9 See http://www.computationalcreativity.net/conferences.
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Product Value is also well associated with system outputs and
products: how valuable or good are the generated artefact(s)? This
is a highly current area of concern within computational creativity,
with much evaluation concentrating on the quality of output [18].
Process The creative processes being incorporated within creativ-
ity can be useful in themselves for learning or studying how cer-
tain approaches and techniques work or for cross-application to
new areas. Systems with an emphasis on modelling process, such
as Misztal and Indurkhya’s poetry generator [31] bring added util-
ity by what they reveal about the processes being modelled.
Person Some creators become more valuable than others as a con-
tributor in their field, based on their personal characteristics, expe-
rience and influence.10 The same can be noted for creative systems
to some extent; some are cited more often than others, for exam-
ple Simon Colton’s HR mathematical discovery system [7] (which
provides a useful example of creativity in a non-artistic domain).
Press If creative activities benefit the external world in
some way, then they have value to the press. As ex-
ample, Harold Cohen’s AARON colouring system has re-
ceived much external attention, from media discussions [29]
through to inspiring a screensaver for personal computers via
http://www.kurzweilcyberart.com.
These above lists are not intended to be a full and conclusive por-
trait of novelty and value within computational creativity. What these
lists illustrate is the different viewpoints that can be uncovered using
the Four Ps as signposts with which to guide our thinking around
computational creativity. The breadth of issues mentioned above
shows aspects of novelty and value within computational creativity
which may not always be accounted for if taking a product/process-
oriented viewpoint; however it is argued here that those perhaps-
overlooked aspects give us a closer rendition of creativity, guiding
us away from incomplete viewpoints of creativity in the context of
our computational work.
4 Summary
The difficulty of understanding what creativity is should not discour-
age us from such an attempt [43, 41, 8]. In creativity research, the
Four Ps construct ensures we pay attention to four key aspects of
creativity: the creative Person, the generated Products, the creative
Process and the Press/Environment hosting and influencing the cre-
ativity. This framework helps us to consider creativity more broadly.
For example, if viewing novelty and value from the perspectives
of product, process, person and press, we uncover various interpre-
tations of these two key concepts within computational creativity
which may otherwise have been overlooked. The Four Ps framework
helps to highlight different perspectives on creativity, to portray cre-
ativity in a fuller context.
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